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This paper examines the incentives that property division laws can have for
divorce and investment in marital assets. This paper considers an environment
in which spouses have multiple inputs, such as time and money, to a marital
asset but the choices a spouse makes with regards to one input, say time,
are not observable to the courts. In such an environment, it is demonstrated
that when spouses specialize, as in a traditional family structure, the common-
law rule may be eﬃciency enhancing. However, when both spouses work and
strong consumption complementarities are present, equal division leads to more
eﬃcient investment in the marital asset. Further, suﬃcient conditions are found
for which the community rule leads to a lower divorce rate than the common-
law rule.
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For those that subscribe to the law and economics way of thinking, the choice of law is
often governed by the nature of transaction costs. In particular, it is generally felt that
the laws that survive the test of time are those that are eﬃciency promoting. With
regards to laws concerning the division of matrimonial property, Canada has switched
entirely to the adoption of the community rule (equal division) over the common-law
rule (division as a function of such factors as contributions made to the assets).
Further, as is detailed below in the section on historical background, the reasons for
the switch to the community rule seem grounded not in eﬃciency reasons but in equity
concerns. This paper presents a simple environment in which the community rule is
eﬃciency enhancing compared to the common-law rule. In addition, it ﬁnds that the
timing of the switch to the community rule (around 1985) may not be coincidental.
Speciﬁcally, it ﬁnds the community rule to be less eﬃcient than the common-law
rule in a traditional household model with specialization (labour versus household
production), but more eﬃcient in a marriage in which consumption complementarities
are part of the beneﬁts to marriage. Thus it is perhaps not surprising that provinces
ﬁrst employed a common-law rule but ultimately switched to the community rule.
This paper considers a married couple that jointly invest in a marital asset, such
as a home. There exist two types of investment: ﬁnancial expenditure and household
production. After investing, each spouse incurs a shock to their utility of marriage
that may lead one or both of them to wish to divorce. If divorce occurs, the marital
asset is divided according to the division rule in eﬀect. It is assumed that not each
type of investment is observable by the courts. Speciﬁcally, the courts are assumed
to be able to observe each spouse’s ﬁnancial investment but not their household pro-
duction. Thus the court may either divide the asset equally between the spouses
independent of their contribution (community rule) or as a function of each spouse’s
1ﬁnancial contribution (common-law rule). This paper considers the eﬃciency im-
plications for both rules in two types of households, as suggested by Stevenson and
Wolfers (2007). First, in a traditional marriage arrangement, in which there is spe-
cialization in production and private consumption as well as consumption of a marital
asset, the common-law rule can be eﬃciency enhancing. However, in a more modern
family structure, in which both spouses work and their exist signiﬁcant consumption
complementarities, the community rule provides incentive to invest in the marital
asset eﬃciently while the common-law rule does not. Further, this paper ﬁnds that
when divorce is ineﬃciently high, the divorce rate will be lower under the community
rule than under the common-law regime for modern families.
This result is reminiscent of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) in which a principal
employs an agent for multiple tasks but cannot observe the agent’s output in some
subset of these jobs. In their paper, contracts that specify bonuses for good per-
formance in the observable tasks lead to too much eﬀort being expended on those
jobs. A law that speciﬁes that the marital asset be divided according to ﬁnancial
contributions is much like a contract that rewards ﬁnancial contributions but does
not reward household production. The environment here is more complicated than
in Holmstrom and Milgrom in that there are two agents that play a non-cooperative
game with each other, but the basic intuition still holds.
1.1 Historical Background
In 1968, Canada passed the Divorce Act which introduced separation as a ground
for divorce. Previously, the only grounds entailed some form of fault (for example,
adultery or abuse). Before the switch to “no-fault”, all Canadian provinces except
Quebec used the title rule, with adjustments made for the degree of fault. The
title rule speciﬁed that upon divorce, each spouse keeps the assets in his/her name.
2Quebec, which follows the civil law tradition, used the community rule, which speciﬁes
that assets be divided equally between the spouses1. After the introduction of no-
fault, most jurisdictions determined that marriage established an implied trust for
each spouse in the other’s property. The extent of that trust varied across provinces,
although all provinces and territories currently divide marital property equally.
The road by which the community rule came to be established in common law
jurisdictions is an interesting one, particularly in Canada. Up until 1979, the title
rule prevailed in Canada, even after the advent of the Divorce Act. As such, sepa-
rate property was a common feature of many marriages. In 1968, however, Murdoch2
started its journey through the courts and sparked a tremendous amount of contro-
versy and questioning of the title rule. When the Murdochs petitioned for divorce in
1968, they had been married for 25 years. They had been ranchers, working together
on a number of properties in Alberta. The titles to all the ranches were held by the
husband, Alex. The wife, Irene, contributed a substantial amount of labour. Besides
acting as a homemaker, she also drove trucks and tractors, worked in the ﬁeld, and
cared for the livestock. However, she did not contribute to the operation ﬁnancially.
In 1973, it was ﬁnally held that her contributions to the marriage did not entitle her
to a share of the family property upon divorce.
Many commentators were critical of this decision. Of particular interest to this
paper is Justice Laskin’s dissent. He argued that “in making the substantial con-
tribution of physical labour, as well as a ﬁnancial contribution, to the acquisition of
successive properties, the wife has, in my view, established a right to an interest which
1Technically, the community rule in Quebec speciﬁes that there is no separate property within the
marriage. This implies that all assets are owned jointly, and so, upon divorce, are divided equally.
Common law jurisdictions generally do not specify property rights within the marriage, but enforce
claims on property upon divorce.
2Murdoch v. Murdoch (1975) 1 S.C.R. 423
3it would be impossible to deny.” Laskin’s dissent was motivated by recent events in
the English courts. Traditionally, English courts ruled that a spouse had no claim on
the matrimonial property unless the owner (usually the husband) expressly created
a trust, or the nonowning spouse could provide evidence of an intention to create
a trust3. However, in 1971, the English Court of Appeal held that if it would be
inequitable for one spouse to claim the matrimonial property as his or her own, then
the court should impose a trust on the owner on behalf of the nonowning spouse4.
Laskin felt that the wife’s labour was an important contribution to the value of the
properties, and so awarding everything to the husband would unjustly enrich him.
As such, a constructive trust should be granted the wife.
Laskin’s dissent provided the basis for the use of trusts in the event of divorce
in Canada. In two important cases shortly after, Rathwell v. Rathwell5 and Pettkus
v. Becker6, the Supreme Court of Canada accepted that an implied trust is created
whenever a spouse contributes ﬁnancially to the matrimonial property (Rathwell),
and, further, that each spouse’s contribution to the marriage is suﬃcient to make the
awarding of the entire property to a single spouse unjust (Pettkus). In other words,
each spouse would now have a claim on any matrimonial property in the event of
divorce.
The particulars of divorce law, such as the division of property, is left to the
provinces in Canada, and so by 1979, each province had amended its family property
laws to incorporate this new regime. However, there remained considerable question
about the extent of the claim each spouse would have. In the subsequent years, the
provincial courts spent considerable time and energy trying to establish a precise
3See especially Pettit v. Pettit, [1970] A.C. 777 (H.L.) and Gissing v. Gissing, [1971] A.C. 886
(H.L.).
4Heseltine v. Heseltine, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 342 (C.A.).
5(1978) 2 S.C.R. 436.
6(1980) 2 S.C.R. 834.
4formula for the division of marital assets. In 1985, the British Columbia Court of
Appeal pronounced a ruling that has become the standard across the country. In
Bawtinheimer v. Bawtinheimer7, it was held that all marital assets should be divided
equally between the spouses under the presumption that spouses jointly contribute to
the ﬁnancial well-being of the family and that such contributions are generally equal
in value. Since this decision, all provinces use the 50/50 division rule as at least the
starting point. For example, British Columbia allows for deviation from equal division
only under exceptional circumstances, which are limited to “(a) the duration of the
marriage, (b) the duration of the period during which the spouses have lived separate
and apart, (c) the date when property was acquired or disposed of, (d) the extent
to which property was acquired by one spouse through inheritance or gift, (e) the
needs of each spouse to become or remail economically independent or self-suﬃcient,
or (f) any other circumstances relating to the acquisition, preservation, maintenance,
improvement or use of property or the capacity or liabilities of a spouse”8. It should
be noted that no provinces allow for deviations from equal division based on unequal
contribution to the marriage.
The above history suggests that the equal division rule was adopted primarily
for equity considerations. To an economist, such a presumption as was made in
Bawtinheimer may seem like an invitation for free-riding and so equity would come
at a cost of eﬃciency. This paper, however, demonstrates that this presumption may
indeed be eﬃciency enhancing.
7(1985) 68 B.C.L.R. 234 (C.A.).
8British Columbia Family Relations Act, section 65.
51.2 The Literature
There exists a large literature in economics, especially empirical, examining divorce
law. A major area of research studies the eﬀects of the switch from fault to no-fault
rules on divorce rates9. Occasionally, it is noted that the property division rule is very
important10. The theoretical literature that examines the eﬀect of property division
rules is considerable smaller.
Clark (1999) demonstrates that when divorce is unilateral11 the divorce rate varies
across diﬀering property rules even in the absence of bargaining frictions. He ﬁnds
that the set of marriages for which divorce is eﬃcient is dependent on the property
division rule, since the division rule determines the outside option. As such, the
divorce rate will vary as the property division rule varies even if there are no trans-
action costs. It should be noted that Clark takes the couple’s history, such as past
investment in durable household public goods, as given.
Aura (2007) compares the community rule and the common-law rule when spouses
are unable to commit to future consumption allocations within the marriage. He
ﬁnds that, if we consider a model in which spouses must negotiate each period over
savings and consumption and in which divorce does not occur on the equilibrium path,
then neither the community rule nor the common-law rule will always implement an
eﬃcient outcome. However, under certain assumptions, the common-law rule will
achieve full eﬃciency while the community rule will not (generically). It should be
noted that the assumption that preferences are such that divorce never occurs in
equilibrium is necessary. In Aura’s model, comparisons of the two rules are diﬃcult
9See, for example Peters (1986 and 1992), Allen (1992a and 1999), Zelder (1993), Friedberg (1998)
and Wolfers (2006).
10See Allen (1990), Gray (1998), Brinig and Buckley (1998) and Mechoulan (2005 and 2006).
11Actually, Clark considers both unilateral and mutual consent divorce, and his results hold for
both cases.
6in such a case.
In contrast, Dnes (1999) ﬁnds that the community rule, rather than the common-
law rule, is welfare enhancing. The argument is as follows. When divorce is unilateral,
divorce occurs when one spouse’s outside opportunities are more attractive than mar-
riage. The incentive for divorce thus occurs when the property division rule speciﬁes
an allocation for a spouse that is greater than the one that would be obtained within
the marriage. Whether divorce occurs or not would depend on the outcome of any
bargaining. Dnes argues that the problem with the common-law rule is that it is
too ﬂexible and does not specify a speciﬁc allocation. As such, uncertainty is gen-
erated and if spouses do not have identical beliefs about the outcome of litigation
(or if there exists some kind of endowment eﬀect), bargaining may fail. In addition,
the community rule provides incentive for long and costly litigation in an attempt
to garner a greater proportion of the marital assets. The community rule, however,
does not suﬀer from such uncertainty, and so can facilitate bargaining and decrease
costly litigation. Further, this has the eﬀect of decreasing the uncertainty surrounding
marriage, making marriage a more attractive option (for single people).
Unlike Clark (1999), this paper considers the eﬀect of the property division on
the household’s investment behavior from the beginning of the marriage. Like Aura
(2007), it compares the community and common-law rules in the presence of trans-
action costs. However, this paper allows for divorce to occur in equilibrium. It ﬁnds
transaction costs (namely the lack of observability of household production by the
courts) that support the community rule as eﬃciency enhancing. This supports the
ﬁndings of Dnes (1999), but for diﬀerent reasons.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 outlines the basic model to be used
in analyzing the traditional and modern family structures. Section 3 considers the
traditional family, while Section 4 examines the modern family. Section 5 concludes.
7All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Basic Model
This paper considers a married couple and their decisions about investment in a
marital asset and divorce. Denote the husband and wife by 1 and 2, respectively.
When married, spouses derive utility from a marital asset. Spouses can contribute
to the asset in two ways, either ﬁnancially or through home production. Let gi and
hi denote i’s ﬁnancial and household contributions to the marital asset, respectively.
Let M (g1,h1,g2,h2), denote the level of the marital asset. Spouses also derive utility
from a match-speciﬁc component when married. Let Ai denote the utility i gets
from being married to j. In addition, spouses may have private consumption apart
from the marital asset. The form of this consumption depends on the structure of
the family. In the traditional model of the family, spouses do not necessarily spend
their leisure time together and so consume a private good. Let xi denote i’s private
consumption. In the modern model of the family, consumption complementarities
play a larger role. In order to simplify the analysis, it is assumed that the marital
asset also represents joint consumption. Let Ui denote i’s utility from being married.
In the traditional family, Ui = M + xi + Ai. In the modern family, Ui = M + Ai12.
Each spouse i begins with wealth ωi (equal to the wage earnings plus the value of
time).
The utility derived simply from being married, Ai, is assumed to be subject to
uncertainty at the time of marriage. After investments have been made, this un-
certainty is resolved. Spouses then decide whether to stay married. It is assumed
12It may appear that people in traditional families are happier than those in modern families. It
need not be the case that M
 
g1,g2,h1,h2
is the same function, however, since this paper makes
no utility or welfare comparisons across family structures.
8that spouses bargain over whether to divorce13 (i.e. divorce occurs only when it is
eﬃcient), although this is relaxed in Section 4.3. It is also assumed that divorce
is costless, although this has no impact on the results. Let Ai ∈ R be distributed
independently and identically with pdf fi (·) and cdf F i (·) and let A1 + A2 ∈ R be
distributed according to the pdf f (·) and the cdf F (·). Both the distribution and
realization of Ai are assumed to be common knowledge.
In the event of divorce, the marital asset is divided according to the rule in ef-
fect. The division rule is determined by the courts. One possibility is to divide the
asset equally. Another possibility is to divide the asset according to each spouse’s
contribution. A key assumption is that the courts can only observe each individual’s
ﬁnancial contribution, g14. This means that when the courts divide the marital asset
according to each spouse’s contribution, spouse 1 receives a proportion of the asset,
α, that is increasing in g1 and decreasing in g2. Thus spouse 1 always receives αM
in the event of divorce, where α is either constant (and generally equal to 1
2) if the
community rule is in eﬀect or a function of the ﬁnancial contributions, g1 and g2. It is
assumed that spouse i’s utility when divorced, V i, is equal to his/her level of wealth.
In order to simplify the analysis, it is assumed that any private consumption occurs
after the divorce decision, so that V 1 = αM + x1 in the traditional family.
3 The Traditional Family
The traditional family structure entails a husband that specializes in labor market
production and a wife that specializes in home production. That is, g1 and h2 are
13This may be possible when institutions exist that make couples discuss the divorce decision
before ﬁling, for example.
14It is also assumed that the courts cannot observe the individual’s wealth and does not know the
function M, so cannot deduce the contributions.
9the only inputs to the marital asset that are used. Less important are consumption
complementarities. As such, this paper models the family environment as one in which
each spouse contributes to a household public good according to their specialization,
and in which there exists private consumption. Since only the husband’s contributions
are observed by the court, the proportion of the marital asset received by the husband
is α(g1) when the common law rule is in eﬀect. Note that the individual budget
constraints are ω1 = g1 + x1 and ω2 = h2 + x2.
3.1 Eﬃciency
In this environment, divorce is eﬃcient if A1 and A2 are such that U1+U2 < V 1+V 2,
which occurs when A1 + A2 < −M. The probability of this is F (−M). Since it is
optimal to specialize, the eﬃcient levels of investment are therefore found by solving
max
g1,h2,x1,x2 F (−M)[M + x1 + x2] + [1 − F (−M)]

2M + x1 + x2 + ¯ A
1 + ¯ A
2
subject to the constraints ω1 = g1 + x1 and ω2 = h2 + x2 and where ¯ Ai is the
expectation of Ai conditional on staying married. Substituting the constraints into
the problem so that the choice variables are g1 and h2, the problem can be rewritten
as
max
g1,h1 [2 − F (−M)]M + [1 − F (−M)]
 ¯ A









2 − F (−M) + f (−M)
 
M + ¯ A
1 + ¯ A
2
+ [1 − F (−M)]
∂ ¯ A1 + ¯ A2




2 − F (−M) + f (−M)
 
M + ¯ A
1 + ¯ A
2
+ [1 − F (−M)]
∂ ¯ A1 + ¯ A2
∂h2 = 1 (3.2)
It is assumed that the second order conditions are satisﬁed so that these conditions
are both necessary and suﬃcient.
103.2 Noncooperative Investment
Now suppose that spouses contribute to the marital asset non-cooperatively. The
probability of divorce is still F (−M), although the level of M may be diﬀerent.
Spouses 1 and 2 respectively solve
max
g1 F (−M)αM + [1 − F (−M)]

M + ¯ A1
+ ω1 − g1
max
h2 F (−M)(1 − α)M + [1 − F (−M)]

M + ¯ A2
+ ω2 − h2




1 − F (−M)(1 − α) + f (−M)

(1 − α)M + ¯ A
1
+[1 − F (−M)]
∂ ¯ A1
∂g1 + MF (−M)
∂α




1 − αF (−M) + f (−M)

αM + ¯ A
2
+ [1 − F (−M)]
∂ ¯ A1
∂g1 M = 1 (3.4)
where ∂α
∂g1 = 0 when the marital asset is divided according to the community rule.
Lemma 1: When the community rule is used, spouses underinvest in the marital
asset.
This is simply the standard result that noncooperative agents undercontribute
to a public good. However, when the common law rule is used, the courts are able
to increase 1’s incentive to contribute by making the share of the asset received
when divorced an increasing function of his contribution. If spouse 2’s marginal
contributions are increasing in spouse 1’s contributions ( ∂2M
∂g1h2 > 0), then this will
have the eﬀect of increasing the contributions of both spouses in equilibrium, leading
to more eﬃcient investment.
Proposition 1: For traditional families, when ∂2M
∂g1h2 > 0, both spouses contribute
more than under the community rule.
Note that if ∂2M
∂g1h2 < 0, then the common law rule will induce 1 to contribute more
11and 2 to contribute less. The net result of this (as compared to the community rule)
is ambiguous. It should be noted, however, that even when the common-law rule
induces both spouses to increase their investment, it will generally be not possible to
implement the eﬃcient outcome. While the common law division rule gives additional
incentive to spouse 1 to increase his contribution, this is not true for spouse 2. This can
be seen by comparing equations 3.1 and 3.3. Suppose that both spouses contributed
eﬃciently. If ∂α
∂g1 took exactly the right value15, then 1 would have no incentive to
deviate. Spouse 2, however, would wish to lower her contribution.
Corollary 1: There is no common law rule, α(g1), that implements the eﬃcient
levels of contribution.
If the court could condition the division of the asset on both spouses’ contribution,
then there would exist a function α(g1,h2) such that ∂α
∂g1 > 0 and ∂α
∂h2 < 0 that would
implement the eﬃcient outcome. However, since 2’s contributions are not observable
to the court, this is not possible.
4 The Modern Family
The modern family is one in which complementarities in consumption are more impor-
tant than those in production, as noted by Stevenson and Wolfers (2007). In addition,
both spouses may work. As such, production consists of two spouses that may both
contribute ﬁnancially and engage in home production. Thus the inputs to the marital
asset are g1, h1, g2 and h2. Note that spouse may diﬀer in their ability to produce




1 − αF (−M) + f (−M)

αM + ¯ A2
+ [1 − F (−M)] ∂ ¯ A
2
∂g1 . See the Proof to
Lemma 1 in the Appendix for the derivation of this.
12comes at the cost of foregone income, let the cost16 of a unit of household production
be ri. Consumption complementarities are modeled by considering all consumption
as non-rivalrous. It is assumed for simplicity that all consumption comes through the
marital asset. The individual’s budget constraint is therefore ωi = gi + rihi. Also,
recall that in the event of divorce, spouse 1 receives a proportion of the marital asset,
α(g1,g2), where ∂α
∂g1 > 0 and ∂α
∂g2 < 0 if the common law rule is used.
4.1 Eﬃciency
As before, divorce is eﬃcient if A1 + A2 < −M. Note that since all consumption
comes through the form of the household public good, both when married and when
divorced, and since divorce only occurs when eﬃcient, the eﬃcient investments in the
marital asset are the ones that maximize its value17. In other words, the eﬃcient
































It is assumed that the value of the marital asset is maximized when both spouses
contribute positive amounts of each investment type18 (i.e. g1,g2,h1,h2 > 0), and so
16Note that this cost incorporates both the foregone income as well as any innate ability the
individual has at household production.
17A formal proof of this has been omitted.
18This is a simplifying assumption only. All results hold if the optimal investments in the marital
asset entail a corner solution.








∂g2 = 0 (4.2)
The following section considers the eﬀect of the property division rule assuming eﬃ-
cient divorce.
4.2 Noncooperative Investment
Given that the probability of divorce is F (−M), spouses choose how to invest in the
marital asset to solve
max
g1, h1 F (−M)αM + [1 − F (−M)]









g2, h2 F (−M)(1 − α)M + [1 − F (−M)]








Substituting the budget constraints into the maximization problems, as above, yields







1 − (1 − α)F (−M) + f (−M)

(1 − α)M + ¯ A
1














1 − (1 − α)F (−M) + f (−M)

(1 − α)M + ¯ A
2






∂g2F (−M)M = 0 (4.4)
Note that when α is a constant ( ∂α
∂gi = 0 for i = 1,2), then the ﬁrst order condition
is satisﬁed when ∂M
∂hi −ri ∂M
∂gi = 019 for i = 1,2. This proves the following proposition.
19Note that when
h
1 − (1 − α)F (−M) + f (−M)

(1 − α)M + ¯ Ai





14Proposition 2: When the community rule is used, spouses invest eﬃciently.
However, if the asset is divided according to some function of each spouse’s ﬁ-
nancial contribution, g1 and g2, then it is possible for a spouse to increase his/her
utility when divorced by increasing gi above the eﬃcient (and value maximizing) level.
While this would decrease the value of the asset, it would increase the share of the
asset that the spouse receives in the event of divorce. This leads to an incentive to
overinvest in the measurable input. Further, the probability of divorce depends on
the wealth that each agent receives upon divorce as well. An increase in gi decreases
j’s wealth when divorced, making j less likely to want to divorce. This has the eﬀect
of decreasing the likelihood that i does not end up divorced when s/he would prefer
to be married. Thus there exists additional incentive to overinvest in g. This result
is formalized in the following proposition.
Proposition 3: When common law rule is used, each spouse overinvests in g and
underinvests in h.
As noted in the introduction, this result is similar to that of Holmstrom and
Milgrom (1991). While this environment does not immediately appear to present a
principal/agent problem, it does in fact have much of the same ﬂavour. Here the
courts play the role of the principal and the spouses the agents. In this case, the
amount of the marital property received after divorce acts as the wage, and so the
proportion that each agent receives should be ﬁxed. Note that this implies that
dividing the asset according to any ﬁxed proportion, such as giving the entire asset to
the wife (or spouse 1), would lead to eﬃcient investment. The proportion with which
the asset is divided can thus have implications for the individual’s decision to marry.
Equal division would make marriage equally attractive for both (potential) spouses,
the ﬁrst order condition is satisﬁed as well. It can be shown that the second order conditions
are not satisﬁed, however.
15and since marriage requires mutual consent, increase the likelihood of a match20.
4.3 Ineﬃcient Divorce
The above analysis assumes that divorce only occurs when eﬃcient. This section
considers the eﬀect of the asset division rule assuming that the decision to divorce is
done non-cooperatively. For a given level of the marital asset, M, and asset division
rule, agent i will prefer divorce to marriage if ωi
2 > M + Ai, or Ai < ωi
2 − M.
The probability that this occurs is Φ(ωi
2 − M). Since divorce rules are eﬀectively
unilateral, divorce occurs whenever at least one of the spouses wishes to divorce. The
probability of divorce is therefore Φ(−(1 − α)M) + Φ(−αM) − Φ(−(1 − α)M) ·
Φ(−αM). Each spouse thus chooses gi and hi to solve
max
g1, h1 Pr(divorce)αM + [1 − Pr(divorce)]









g2, h2 Pr(divorce)(1 − α)M + [1 − Pr(divorce)]








where the probability of divorce is as given above. Solving for the equilibrium in-
vestments for both the community rule and the common-law rule yields the following
result:
Lemma 2: The equilibrium value of the marital asset is greater under the community
rule than under the common-law rule.
Note that an increase in M leads to a decrease in the probability of divorce. This
would suggest that jurisdictions with the community rule would have a lower divorce
20See Allen (1992b) for an argument as to why a 50/50 split should be expected. While that paper
considers a 50/50 division of shared assets within a marriage, the same argument would apply to
the division of a marital asset upon divorce.
16rate than those with the common-law rule. However, this is not necessarily the case.
In particular, spouses may diﬀer in their marginal incentive to divorce. That is,
increasing 1’s wealth when divorced (holding the total level of the marital asset, M,
constant) may have a greater eﬀect on the probability of divorce than increasing 2’s
wealth. In this case, a redistribution of post-divorce wealth from 1 to 2 would reduce
the probability of divorce. Since the common-law rule may entail greater post-divorce
wealth for 2 than for 1, this may have the net eﬀect of reducing the probability of
divorce over the community rule, even after accounting for the reduced level of M.
A suﬃcient condition to ensure that this does not occur, then, is that spouses are
identical with regards to their distributions of marital utility, Ai. The following
proposition demonstrates this formally.
Proposition 4: When F 1 (·) = F 2 (·) = Φ(·), the divorce rate is lower under the
community rule than under the common-law rule.
We therefore have conditions such that the community rule not only leads to more
eﬃcient investment in marital assets, but also to lower divorce. As a result, this paper
ﬁnds conditions for the promulgation of the community rule to be based on eﬃciency
considerations and not just equity.
5 Conclusion and Discussion
This paper considers the diﬀering incentives that the common-law and community
rules have for investment in the marriage as a function of the family structure. It ﬁnds
that, in a traditional family with production complementarities, the common-law rule
can be eﬃciency enhancing. However, in a modern family, where complementarities
are in consumption, the community rule gives better incentives for investment in
marital assets. These ﬁndings perhaps give insight as to why Canadian provinces
17initially adopted common-law rules in 1968, but began switching to community rules
in 1985.
Community rules began within the civil law codes of France and Spain, and
so those countries and their colonies (especially in Africa and South and Central
America) have employed various forms of community rules for considerable lengths
of time21. Other countries, such as the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and Turkey22
Also employ community rules. It is interesting to note that while there has been
some movement to community rules in the United States, it has in general not been
the same. California introduced “no-fault” divorce in 1970, and every other state
adopted some form of no-fault divorce in the succeeding 15 years. During this pe-
riod, the Supreme Court of the United States ruled that laws that entrenched men as
estate executors were in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause23. This meant that many states were forced to change their property division
rules.
Today, ten US states24 (Alaska, Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas, Washington and Wisconsin) and Puerto Rico enforce equal claims
on all marital assets25, a form of the community rule. The remainder of the states
use a common-law rule that states that property be divided “equitably”. Equitable
division allows that one spouse may receive more than half of the assets out of fairness
considerations26. In particular, fairness may dictate that marital assets be divided in
proportion to the contributions of each spouse. Freed and Walker (1985) note that
21Rheinstein and Glendon (1980).
22Rheinstein and Glendon (1980) and http://www.international-divorce.com.
23Reed v Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 1971.
24Taken from the American Bar Association’s Family Law Quarterly (2008).
25It should be noted that jurisdictions vary signiﬁcantly in what constitutes a marital asset.
26It should be noted that some community states and some equitable states allow for adjustments
to the property division when fault occurs. See Brinig and Buckley (1998) for a description of
division rules used in each state.
18“the doctrine of equitable distribution permits the spouse who has made material
economic contribution toward the acquisition of property ...to claim an equitable
interest in such property”27. While such ‘economic contributions’ are often deﬁned
to include household production28.
It is worth mentioning that if all contributions are observable by the courts, then
the common law rule, or equitable distribution based on contributions to the marital
asset, is the optimal rule as it helps overcome any free rider problem. Note that it
may be the case that the 40 US states that employ a common law rule have developed
institutions that better allow courts to observe non-ﬁnancial institutions, or possibly
that these states generally divide assets equally even though contributions may not
be equal. Allen (1988) suggests that the latter may be true. Indeed, rulings by
various states’ courts suggest that the practice is to use equal division. For example,
in Oregon, the case in re Marriage of Francis29 decided that there “is a presumption
that marital assets are to be divided equally upon dissolution of the marriage” even
though marital contributions were not equal. As such, states that technically employ
common law rules may be using community rules in practice.
6 Appendix
Proof to Lemma 1:
Subtracting the non-cooperative ﬁrst order conditions, equation 3.3 and 3.4, (and
27Freed and Walker at p. 357.
28For example, Arkansas’ Code allows for division of marital assets to be inﬂuenced by ”contribu-
tion of each party in acquisition, preservation, or appreciation of marital property, including services
as a homemaker”, Arkansas Code, Title 9, Subtitle 2, Chapter 9-12-315.
29157 P.3d 1202 (Or. Ct. App. 2007).
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Thus each agent would contribute less than the eﬃcient level under the community
rule. 
Proof to Proposition 3:
Suppose each spouse invests at the eﬃcient level, so that ∂M
∂hi − ri ∂M
∂gi = 0 for
i = 1,2. Note that equations 4.3 and 4.4 are equal to −ri ∂α
∂giF (−M)M < 0. Thus,
each spouse would prefer to decrease the contributions hi and increase gi. 
Proof to Lemma 2:
Recall that the probability of divorce is given by
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Thus divorce becomes less likely the greater the level of M. Taking the derivative
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Substituting the budget constraints into the maximization problems so that the

















































Note that when α is a constant function, then the value of the asset is maximized.
Further, when the common-law rule is in eﬀect, however, the equilibrium level of the
marital asset is less than maximal. 
Proof to Proposition 4:
This proof considers the behavior of spouse 1. The probability of divorce is given
by
Φ(−(1 − α)M) + Φ(−αM) − Φ(−(1 − α)M) · Φ(−αM)
As noted in the proof to Lemma 2,
∂Pr(divorce)
∂M < 0. Thus divorce becomes less likely
the greater the level of M. Now consider the derivative with respect to α.
[1 − Φ(−αM)]φ(−(1 − α)M)M − [1 − Φ(−(1 − α)M)]φ(−αM)M






























Thus the probability of divorce is minimized30 when α = 1
2, for a given M.
Since, for any level of M, the probability of divorce is minimized when α = 1
2, and
the community rule leads to a greater level of the asset, we therefore have that the
probability of divorce is less under the community rule than under the common-law
rule. 
30The second order conditions are not shown here, but can be shown to be satisﬁed for a minimum.
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